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Abstract We argue that some algorithms are value-laden,
and that two or more persons who accept different value-
judgments may have a rational reason to design such
algorithms differently. We exemplify our claim by dis-
cussing a set of algorithms used in medical image analysis:
In these algorithms it is often necessary to set certain
thresholds for whether e.g. a cell should count as diseased
or not, and the chosen threshold will partly depend on the
software designer’s preference between avoiding false
positives and false negatives. This preference ultimately
depends on a number of value-judgments. In the last sec-
tion of the paper we discuss some general principles for
dealing with ethical issues in algorithm-design.
Keywords Algorithm  Image analysis 
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Introduction
The focus of this article is on ethical aspects of algorithms.
An algorithm is, roughly speaking, a finite sequence of
well-defined instructions that describe in sufficiently great
detail how to solve a problem. Both computers and humans
use algorithms for solving a wide range of problems.
However, in this paper we shall be exclusively concerned
with algorithms implemented in computers.
At first glance it might be tempting to conclude that
algorithms are value-free entities that do not, at least not in
their most abstract form, have any ethical dimensions.
However, in this article we argue that this commonsense
view about algorithms is false. Many, but not all, algo-
rithms implicitly or explicitly comprise essential value-
judgments. By an ‘essential value-judgment’ we mean the
following: If two algorithms are designed to perform the
same task, such as classifying a cell as diseased or non-
diseased, these algorithms are essentially value-laden if one
cannot rationally choose between them without explicitly
or implicitly taking ethical concerns into account. Another
way of saying this is that the algorithm cannot be designed
without implicitly or explicitly taking a stand on ethical
issues, some of which may be highly controversial.
If true, our claim about essentially value-laden algo-
rithms has to be taken seriously by software engineers who
design algorithms. If some algorithms are essentially value-
laden, i.e. if people who design algorithms cannot avoid
making ethical judgments about what is good and bad, then
it is reasonable to maintain that software designers are
morally responsible for the algorithms they design.1
Although the term ‘ethics of algorithms’ might have far-
reaching connotations, it nevertheless captures what is at
stake here. If our claim about essentially value-laden
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1 Software designers can, of course, be morally responsible also for
algorithms that are not essentially value-laden. A fatal accident
caused by a faulty algorithm can be (partially) blamed on the software
designer, irrespective of whether the algorithm is essentially value-
laden or not.
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algorithms is correct, there will indeed be an ethics of
algorithms.
The issue that we address has to some extent already
been touched upon in the literature. Turilli seeks to develop
a solution to ‘‘the problem of specifying computational
systems that behave in accordance with a given set of
ethical principles’’.2 Allen et al. argue that, ‘‘we need to
integrate artificial moral agents into… new technologies to
manage their complexity’’.3 Finally, Arkin argues that
there is a need for, ‘‘immediate investment in … machine/
robot ethics’’.4 Although we do not necessarily disagree
with these authors, we wish to point out that their papers
are concerned with questions that are slightly different
from the issue discussed here. Turilli, Allen et al., and
Arkin discuss how we can construct algorithms and sys-
tems that behave in accordance with ethical principles. As
we argue in the next section, such algorithms need not be
essentially value-laden themselves. Indeed, an algorithm or
system that behaves in accordance with some ethical
principles can itself be ethically neutral. What we wish to
discuss in this article is the ethical features of the algorithm
itself.
The structure of this article is as follows. In ‘‘Value-
laden algorithms and the design process’’ we characterise
some of the central concepts used in the paper and argue
that algorithm design is in many respects similar to
designing other technological artefacts. In ‘‘A real exam-
ple’’ we discuss a real example of an essentially value-
laden algorithm used in medical image analysis, and in
‘‘The precautionary principle and ethical theories’’ we
discuss some ways of dealing with the ethical problems
raised by this algorithm. Finally, in ‘‘Should ethical values
be user-defined?’’, we argue that software designers should
as far as possible leave ethical choices to users, and when
this is not possible the ethical assumptions underlying the
algorithm should at least be made transparent. This may
lead to new or refined procedures in the process of software
engineering.
Value-laden algorithms and the design process
It is notoriously difficult to give a precise characterisation
of what an algorithm is. Numerous definitions have been
proposed in the literature.5 However, nothing in our rea-
soning hinges on how exactly algorithms are formally
defined. The definition of an algorithm suggested in
‘‘Introduction’’ will suffice for our present purposes.
Arguably, the claim that many algorithms implicitly or
explicitly comprise essential value-judgments cannot be
accurately assessed without first defining some of its cen-
tral concepts. We take a value-judgment to be any propo-
sition expressing a view on how things ought to be or not to
be, or what is good or bad, or desirable or undesirable. It
takes little reflection to see that not all algorithms express
value-judgments. Consider, for instance, algorithms used
for calculating the lexicographical order of a finite set of
strings, such as the ones used to put words in alphabetical
order. Given the input to this algorithm, there is only one
possible correct output. Therefore, this task is fully speci-
fied in terms of various logical relationships, which require
no approximation or interpretation.
That said, some algorithms clearly produce genuine
value-judgments. Consider, for example, algorithms used
in decision support programs, i.e. systems that help
decision makers to make better decisions by ranking a set
of alternative actions with respect to some predefined
criteria. A typical outcome of an algorithm used in such a
program is a verdict like ‘‘Alternative X is the best
option’’ or ‘‘Alternative X is better than alternative Y
with respect to criterion Z’’. It would be pointless to deny
that these sentences express genuine value-judgments.
This is acknowledged by Turilli, who discusses how to
specify ‘‘systems that behave in accordance with a given
set of ethical principles’’.6 However, the fact that an
algorithm or system yields a value-judgment as its output
does not prove that the algorithms used for producing the
value-judgments are essentially value-laden, as pointed
out in ‘‘Introduction’’. The string of sentences (or data)
that is produced by running through an algorithm might
very well be value-laden even if the algorithm itself is not
value-laden.
Let us take a closer look at this important point. The
general features of the kind of value-judgments generated
by decision support programs can be clarified by invoking
Kant’s famous distinction between hypothetical and cate-
gorical imperatives. A hypothetical imperative is a state-
ment about what you ought to do, given that you wish to
respect some exogenously defined goal. ‘‘Don’t study
philosophy if you wish to become rich’’ is a hypothetical
imperative. A categorical imperative is a value-judgment
that tells us what we ought to do irrespective of our desires
or goals. The distinction between hypothetical and cate-
gorical imperatives does not exhaust the logical space of all
possible value-judgments, but it illuminates the nature of
the kind of value-judgments that are most likely to be
encountered in computer programs used for aiding
2 Turilli (2007: 49).
3 Allen et al. (2006: 13).
4 Arkin (2009: 2).
5 See e.g. Sipser (1997). 6 Turilli (2007: 49).
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decisions. Such value-judgments are best characterised as
hypothetical value-judgments, because they tell you what
you ought to do given that you wish to achieve a specific
aim. However, as pointed out above, the presence of a
hypothetical value-judgment does not entail that the algo-
rithm used for generating the recommendations comprises
value-judgments. The underlying algorithm can, when
taken in isolation, be completely value-free.
So what, then, could it possibly mean to say that an
algorithm comprises a value-judgment and therefore has an
essential ethical dimension? Consider the following
suggestion.
ALGORITHM COMPRISING AN ESSENTIAL
VALUE-JUDGMENT
An algorithm comprises an essential value-judgment if
and only if, everything else being equal, software
designers who accept different value-judgments would
have a rational reason to design the algorithm differently
(or choose different algorithms for solving the same
problem).
Note that this criterion does not make the definition
circular. It is indeed true that the term ‘value-judgment’
occurs both in the left-hand part and in the right-hand part
of the criterion, but the term that is to be explained is
‘algorithm comprising an essential value-judgment’, not
‘value-judgment’. (Recall that we have already explained
above how we understand the term ‘value-judgment’.) It is
also worth noting that our necessary and sufficient criterion
explains why an algorithm producing hypothetical imper-
atives, such as the decision aid program discussed above,
does not comprise essential value-judgments. If two or
more software designers are asked to write a decision aid
program it does not matter what ethical principles (or other
value-judgments) the software designers themselves sub-
scribe to. Since the aim of the program is to produce
hypothetical imperatives, the algorithm itself can be
entirely value-free.7 It is certainly true that value-judg-
ments are produced by a successful implementation of the
program, but it is not true that two or more software
designers accepting different value-judgments would ever
have a rational reason to design the underlying algorithm
differently.
We now come to a fundamental assumption in this
paper, viz. that a software designer designing an algorithm
is facing a decision process that is in many respects similar
to that faced by people designing other technological
artifacts. If true, this entails that value-judgments that are
built into an algorithm will in many respects be similar to
value judgments that feature in other design processes. For
this reason it is helpful to elaborate a bit on the design
processes from which algorithms and other technological
artifacts are derived.
Let us first explain what we mean by ‘design’ by pro-
posing a necessary condition we believe all such activities
have to fulfill. (For present purposes, we can do without a
sufficient condition.)
DESIGN ACTIVITY: Something is a design activity
only if it is an activity where a designer (or a team of
designers) make decisions in order to reach a pre-defined
goal.
We use the term ‘variable’ both for characterising what
it means to ‘make decisions’ and for ‘reaching a goal’. We
assume that a variable stores exactly one piece of infor-
mation. For instance, when designing a bicycle, the
designer can decide that the front wheel shall have a
diameter of 60 cm; this ‘diameter of the front wheel’ is a
variable, and ‘60 cm’ is the value stored in this variable.
However, we must carefully distinguish the (four) different
ways in which values can be stored in a variable.
First, the designer can decide that a variable shall have a
particular value. For the rest of this paper, this settles our
definitions of ‘making a decision’ as ‘assigning a value to a
variable’, assuming that the decision-maker has the
authority to assign the chosen value to the variable in
question. For instance, no designer can decide that ‘this
bicycle will have a maximum velocity of 250 km/hour’,
since the maximum velocity of a bicycle is the result of a
range of other decisions and empirical circumstances.
Variables that may occur in a decision are called decision
variables or category-I variables.
Second, a variable can take a value as part of the
assessment of the degree to which a design-objective was
met. For instance, suppose the bicycle we are designing
should be as light as possible; then the value of the variable
‘weight of the bicycle’ helps to assess if we were suc-
cessful. Such variables will be called objective variables or
category-II variables. Notice that any category-II variable
receives a value as the final consequence of assigning
values to category-I variables, plus a number of (physical,
economical, and social) mechanisms that causally propa-
gate the category-I values through the designed artifact and
its usage.
From the account sketched above, we see that cate-
gory-II variables are (in a mathematical sense) a function
of category-I variables: the design function. However,
they are also a function of another class of variables. In
order to see this, note that the weight of the bicycle
depends on e.g. the density of the chosen material. If we
7 It is worth noticing that some decision support systems may apply a
reasoning algorithm that, although deterministic, is too complicated to
be followed by human users (e.g., since it would take too long to be
practical). In that case, the user cannot do anything else but follow up
on the algorithm’s suggestion or ignore the suggestion altogether.
This renders the decision support algorithm value-laden.
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choose carbon fiber (a possible value for the category-I
variable ‘material of the bicycle’), we have to accept that
the density of carbon fiber occurs as an argument in our
design function. Such variables cannot be controlled by
the designer. We call them context variables or category-
III variables. From the perspective of the designer, they
are constants.
In all but trivial cases, the design function is immen-
sely complicated. It is next to impossible to write down
the values of category-II variables even if we know the
values of category-I and category-III variables. We can
regard it, however, as a composition of a large number of
much simpler functions. The weight, for instance, is the
sum of the weights of the two wheels plus the weight of
the frame. The weight of one wheel is not a category-II
variable (because the design is not necessarily better if
this weight is less); it is also not a category-I variable (if
we decide the diameter, the weight is no longer inde-
pendent); finally it is not in category-III because it is not
a constant. It is what we call an auxiliary variable or a
category-IV variable.
This completes our general outline of the design pro-
cess. What it amounts to is the establishment of a network
of functional relationships between variables in categories
I, II, III, and IV and the assignment of values to the cate-
gory-I variables; the ‘quality’ of the design is assessed by
inspecting the resulting values for the category-II variables.
Consider Fig. 1.
The four categories characterised in Fig. 1 suggest an
important link between ethics and the freedom of the
designer: The choice of category-II variables may reflect,
among other things, the designer’s ethical view. For
example, the designer might stipulate that the bicycle be
constructed from recycled materials (reflecting the value of
sustainability), and that it must be manufacturable in third-
world countries (reflecting the value of geopolitical jus-
tice). In this respect we should observe that category-II
variables come in two versions: requirements, that is:
predicates that must be true (say, ‘the bicycle shall be
lighter than 15 kg’), and desires that relate to variables
subject to optimisation (say, ‘the bicycle shall be as light as
possible’). Among other things, the framework of four
categories allows us to clarify trade-offs in the design, it
helps us to pinpoint compromises, and it provides insight
into possible design alternatives. We will use it here to
decouple, on the one hand, the acceptance of an ethical
position (such as the categorical imperative) from the
implementation of the consequences of this position in a
design (a hypothetical imperative): The first consists of
deciding which ethical values should be represented; the
second of representing these ethical values in terms of
category-II variables.
A real example
In this section we discuss some examples of algorithms that
are essentially value-laden. All our examples, one of which
is real, are concerned with a particular kind of algorithm
used in medical image technologies. Very briefly put,
medical image technologies aim at representing human
biological structures in computers in an accurate way, such
as human organs and cells in blood samples, and thereby
improve the diagnostic or therapeutic prospects of diseases
affecting the biological structures in question. One of the
many ethical issues raised by such algorithms is the risk of
using algorithms that produce false positive and false
negative results. By definition, a false positive result occurs
whenever the algorithm triggers the system to count
something (a cell, a symptom of a disease) in a digital
image that is not actually there. A false negative occurs if
an algorithm in a similar vein fails to identify a structure in
the picture that is actually there.
For all practical means, it is virtually impossible to
totally eliminate the risk of getting false positives and false
negatives. However, if one is willing to accept a large
number of false positive results one will typically get a
smaller number of false negatives. In order to understand
why, imagine you are asked by an eccentric millionaire to
build a device that automatically counts the number of
tigers in the jungle who passes through a certain spot.
Naturally, if you build a device that simply counts every-
thing yellow that passes through the jungle you will get a
rather large number of false positive results, since e.g. bees,
bananas, and yellow flowers will trigger the device.
However, if on the other hand, you impose more conser-
vative criteria on what is to count as a positive result and
design the device such that only very large yellow items are
detected, then you can expect the number of false negatives
to rise (since e.g. new-born tigers babies will not be
detected by the device).
Clearly, software designers designing toy algorithms for
detecting tigers, as well as real-life algorithms used in
Fig. 1 Designing as a process of connecting 4 types of variables.
Arrows indicate functional dependencies
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medical image technologies, have to make a trade-off
between minimising the number of false positives or the
number of false negative results. This trade-off will inev-
itably be based on a value-judgment. There is simply no
objective fact of the matter about whether it is more
desirable to avoid a false positive or a false negative.
Different users may have different preferences, and several
conflicting preferences appear to be equally rational. It
therefore seems hard to deny that an algorithm used for,
say, counting the percentage of cells infected by a virus in
relation to the number of non-infected cells will invariably
contain a value-judgment about how many false positive
results are tolerable in relation to the number of false
negative ones. That said, both false positive and false
negative results may give rise to severe negative effects for
individual patients. Doctors base diagnostic as well as
therapeutic decisions on what they come to believe about
e.g. the number of infected cells in relation to the number
of non-infected cells.
We can also illustrate our point about essentially value-
laden algorithms by way of a real example. To start with,
recall that in ‘‘Value-laden algorithms and the design
process’’ we discussed some of the choices faced by
designers by discussing the design of a material object (a
bicycle). However, as pointed out in that section, the
design process is roughly the same when designing
immaterial artifacts such as algorithms. We can therefore
use the general design framework introduced in ‘‘Value-
laden algorithms and the design process’’ for illustrating
how values for category-I variables propagate in the
direction of category-II variables.
In the image to the right we see an MR-scan depicting a
cross section of a human heart. For the purpose of diag-
nosing a variety of possible pathologies, it is necessary to
accurately estimate the blood volume of the heart during
various stages of a heart-beat cycle. The difference
between blood and heart muscle tissue occurs as a differ-
ence in grey values in MR images. Estimating the blood
volume starts with establishing which part of the image is
colored lighter grey, and counting the number of pixels in
this light grey area. This is called segmentation between
light and dark, as depicted schematically in the diagram
below.
One way of carrying out a segmentation is to use a
numerical threshold, say T. This means that pixels with a
lightness value above T are labeled ‘light’ and pixels with a
lightness value below T are labeled ‘dark’. The border
between light and dark areas is, however, not sharp
(Fig. 2).8
It is quite common to introduce thresholds in segmen-
tation-like algorithms. Such thresholds serve as nice
examples of category-I variables in the design process of
the algorithm. There is no a priori correct value for such
thresholds. There is no rigorous first principles from which
they can be derived, since the noise in the image is an
inevitable artifact of the MR measuring process, caused by
numerous non-modeled sources. Software engineers typi-
cally choose a value that ‘seems reasonable’ for thresholds.
In the example above we see how the choice for this
threshold influences the estimated blood volume. This
estimate will in turn affect further values, and eventually
the diagnosis. So in borderline cases the diagnosis will
(indirectly) depend on the value of the threshold T.
Of course, if the anatomical configuration is far from a
borderline case (either ‘very’ healthy or ‘very’ pathologi-
cal), there is obviously no problem. For the majority of
pathological conditions, however, there is a continuum
between ‘healthy’ and ‘pathological’. Somewhere in this
continuum there is a grey zone where the diagnostic out-
come will critically depend on thresholds somewhere along
the computational pipeline.9
8 The algorithm outlined here is a deliberate simplification of actual,
modern segmentation algorithms. In particular, the algorithms
demonstrated in the cited website are much more sophisticated. For
Footnote 8 continued
our argument, however, this is not relevant. Even advanced algo-
rithms typically involve parameters, the values of which are to be
chosen in order to decide, eventually, between ‘normal’ and ‘patho-
logical’ cases.
9 In principle, an algorithm can detect when it bases a decision on a
‘near-borderline’-case. Sophisticated algorithms sometimes give an
estimate of the reliability of their conclusions (for instance: long-term
weather predictions, e.g. in the form of error-bandwidths). In this
way, an algorithm can become less value-laden, since it moves part of
the responsibility in the direction of the (human) user.
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Now, given that we take the computational output of a
medical diagnosis support system to be a designed artifact,
we can ask ourselves what the category-II variables are in
this example. Apart from trivial ones, such as patient safety
during clinical measurement, and operational comfort for
the medical specialist, we may want the quality of the
(automated) diagnosis to be ‘good’. But the notion of
goodness must of course be rendered more precise, and this
is exactly where our observations concerning false posi-
tives and false negatives come in. In borderline cases the
bias towards false positives or false negatives may to a
large extent be determined by the values of thresholds or
other category-I variables.
At this point it could be objected that the best way
forward is to design the algorithm such that it totally
eliminates all false positive and false negative results.
However, a closer analysis of the risks for getting false
positives and false negatives in medical images shows that
this is not likely to be a feasible option. First, all algorithms
that are applied to a large set of measurements will be
sensitive to stochastic effects in the data set, and this will
automatically yield false positive and negative effects.
Second, it should be noted that the images are in most cases
numerical (re-)constructions of large amounts of physical
measurements. This point has important consequences:
Nowadays the quality of such computer generated images
is getting close to being photo realistic. That is, the data is
presented (rendered) as if it is an actual photo of some 3-D
internal organ or tissue structure, perhaps even isolated
from its environment. Such rendering or isolation, how-
ever, requires complicated algorithms that include seg-
mentation (as mentioned above), as well as much other
subtle image processing. So rather than being objective
photographs, the 3D medical images that specialists look at
(and base their diagnosis on) are the result of an elaborate
algorithmic process, depending on arbitrary thresholds in a
difficult-to-predict manner. Now, medical specialists, like
any other humans, are accustomed to interpret plausible 3-
D images as accurate projections of corresponding 3-D
objects. It is very difficult not to interpret a realistically
looking 3-D image as a trustworthy projection of a 3-D
object. This introduces the risk that one will forget that in
order to generate these 3-D images, a number of decisions
about thresholds had to be taken. Had some decisions been
taken differently, the image could have looked (very) dif-
ferent—and, as we argue, there is no a priori way to give
the correct value for such thresholds.
Understanding the relations between what is seen in the
image and what really exists in a patient’s body (or in the
microscopic slice of tissue being examined) therefore
requires a thorough understanding of the various algorith-
mic steps that are applied to the physical data in their
transformation towards a collection of colored pixels. Such
transformations include a choice of filters (involving vari-
ables with values that may significantly affect the eventual
‘looks’ of the image – and therefore the conspicuousness of
certain types of anomalies) and perhaps geometrical algo-
rithms (such as contouring, segmentation, tracking, etcet-
era). These filters and algorithms have to be chosen with
some goals in mind – but these goals cannot typically, for
practical reasons, be formulated in terms of minimising the
risk of acquiring false negatives.
The third and last reason why it is not feasible to design
algorithms that avoid all errors can be formulated as fol-
lows. Many (semi)automated diagnostic tools have been
developed in recent years, and these diagnostic tools typ-
ically incorporate implied hypotheses of expected pathol-
ogies. For instance: a probe to identify a potential
aneurism, stenosis or tumor can only do so because it
expects certain characteristic features of, say the shape or
volume of such anomalies. An experienced medical doctor
realises when she sees something ‘unexpected’; a software
program usually cannot. Again, these diagnostic tools may
not have been developed with the goal of minimising the
percentage of false negatives in mind. Finally, there is one
further problem. Software for complicated tasks such as
medical diagnosis is often immensely complicated. Much if
it consists of components that may have been developed
earlier for ‘general purposes’; these components are re-
used in order to make the software production process
economically feasible. Segmentation algorithms are an
example of such components. Components are preferably
treated as black boxes: based on their formal, functional
specifications, their behavior can be assumed to be ‘cor-
rect’. The ethical position, however, that was adopted
during the construction of such a component when either
choosing a more conservative or more liberal threshold, is
Fig. 2 Segmentation in a noisy image. For a larger threshold value,
T1, the estimated area V1 of the ‘blood’ segment will be lower than the
estimated area V2 which is found with a lower threshold T2. It is not
a priori clear, however, which of the two threshold values is the
‘correct’ one. The software engineer chooses a threshold without real
argument—thereby biasing the outcome of the algorithm when it is
used on patient data. This may statistically influence the change of false
positive diagnostic errors in favour of false negatives, or vice versa
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typically not part of their formal specification.10 That
means that the same segmentation algorithm, applied in
two different systems, will behave equally with respect to
its formal, functional requirements, but at the same time it
may behave oppositely with respect to its tendency to
produce false positive or false negative judgments.
The total complexity of highly interrelated physical
techniques, algorithms, heuristics and visualisation meth-
ods is immense, and there is little hope to optimise the
entire, integrated chain in terms of minimising the chance
of false negatives. What may be feasible, however, it to
take this chain apart in a systematic way, and to analyse the
various stages as if they were (to some extent) independent.
This route may be facilitated to use a framework such as
the 8-layers model developed by one of the authors to
argue about the information contents in images. This model
separates this information into coherent chunks (e.g., the
shape-related information is separated from the texture-
related information, which is separated from the 3-D sur-
face related information, etcetera.)
The precautionary principle and ethical theories
In this section we discuss two different ways of addressing
ethical issues raised by the risk of obtaining false positive
and false negative results when using medical image
algorithms. In the next section we shall identify and discuss
some ethical issues that apply to algorithm design in
general.
Briefly put, we propose that a possible way of managing
false positive and false negative results obtained from
medical image algorithms is to adopt an epistemic inter-
pretation of the precautionary principle.11 The second
option, which we will also explore in depth, is to approach
this choice as an ethical judgment to be determined by an
ethical theory.
Let us first consider the precautionary-oriented, episte-
mic strategy. The precautionary principle was originally
invoked by policy makers for addressing environmental
issues, such as global warming, toxic waste disposal, and
marine pollution. In recent years it has also been suggested
that the precautionary principle may also be applied to
medical issues. David B. Resnik argues that ‘‘properly
understood, the [Precautionary Principle] can provide
physicians and patients with a useful approach to medical
decision making.’’ The precautionary principle can,
however, be interpreted in many different ways. According
to the epistemic (belief-guiding) interpretation outlined in
Peterson (2007), the precautionary principle should be
characterised in terms of what it urges us to believe. To put
it more precisely, the epistemic version of the precaution-
ary principle holds that it is better to get a false positive
rather than a false negative result, contrary to what is
commonly accepted in science, since this will prevent
doctors and patients from falsely believing that someone
who is in fact ill is healthy.
Scientists generally agree that it is more important to
avoid false positives than false negatives. This is because
scientific knowledge tends to be cumulative: We add new
beliefs about what the world is like to a set of already
existing beliefs; and the justification for the new beliefs
typically depends in more or less intricate ways on the old
beliefs. Therefore, if we start to accept too many false
positive beliefs we may end up in a situation in which
future research is directed in the wrong direction by our
false positives. A more conservative approach, in which
false negatives are preferred over false positives, is more
likely to be successful in the long run, since it makes it
more likely that we will not base new beliefs on old but
false ones.
However, when discussing medical image algorithms it
is far from clear that we should adopt the same set of
(epistemic) values that guide, or at least ought to guide,
scientific research.12 The reason for this is that the conse-
quences of falsely believing something to be safe when it is
not might be disastrous. If the algorithm is designed such
that doctors come to believe that patients who are actually
diseased are not, then the doctors may indirectly cause
indirect harm to patients by failing to treat them. We
therefore conclude that when addressing ethical aspects of
medical image algorithms it is far from clear that medical
decision makers should prefer algorithms that make them
believe what is most likely to be true. On the contrary, a
strong case can be made that medical image algorithms
should be designed such that they are more likely to pro-
duce false positive rather than false negative results. That
said, it is of course essential to make sure that an increased
number of false positives does not lead to too many
unnecessary and potentially dangerous operations. The
computer image is just a tool. The final responsibility for
10 By ‘ethical position’ we mean the decision at which level the
threshold should lie. We will deal with this in detail in the next
section.
11 This section is partly based on some ideas first presented in
Peterson (2007).
12 To be precise, we should distinguish between on the one hand,
medical imaging algorithms used exclusively in interaction with a
medical specialist, and on the other hand, algorithms used to screen
large volumes of data to seek for pathologies. In the latter type of
cases the data volume is too large for (human) medical staff to handle
in given clinical contexts (consider e.g. yearly screenings of ten
thousands of women for early signs of breast cancer). In such cases,
the risk for statistically significant biases in the results (that are
ethically value-laden) is much larger than in the first case.
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deciding whether a surgical intervention is appropriate has
to be taken by the doctor.
It is important to bear in mind that our conclusion about
the importance of avoiding false negatives in medical
image algorithms is a value-judgment, not a factual one.
No observations or other purely empirical methods can be
appealed to for backing up this conclusion. This is part of
the explanation of why medical image algorithms are
essentially value-laden. However, as with nearly all value-
judgments, good reasons can also be given against this
value-judgment. For example, it could be claimed that the
software designer designing the algorithm ought to perform
a detailed cost-benefit analysis of the pros and cons of
accepting different trade-off rates between false positives
and false negatives. This is an approach that, broadly
speaking, tallies well with traditional consequentialist
intuitions. It may turn out, for instance that the total utility
of accepting some false negatives but avoiding a very large
number of false positives may actually be optimal, because
of various empirical circumstances. It is beyond the scope
of this paper to take a definitive stand on whether the
consequentialist view outlined above is at least as plausible
(or even more plausible) than the precautionary approach.
Here we just wish to highlight that the choice of a trade-off
rate between false positives and false negatives is a genuine
value-judgment, and that this makes medical image algo-
rithms essentially value-laden.
Let us now consider an alternative, slightly more theo-
retical approach to the choice between false negatives and
false positives. The ethical assumption underlying this
approach is in short the following: A doctor’s decision
about whether avoiding false negatives is better than
avoiding false positives should depend in part on the
answer to the question of how dangerous the suspected
disease is for the patient. The more dangerous it is, the
more important it will be to detect it, and the more
acceptable it is to take the risk of mistakenly identifying it
in a patient (i.e. to produce a false positive). The same
holds, secondly, for contagious diseases that could jeop-
ardise others. Third, a rising number of false negatives is
less acceptable if the faulty diagnosis is likely to bring
about drastic side-effects such as e.g. a dramatically
diminished quality of life after diagnosis, or even the
triggering of suicidal tendencies in those who are mistak-
enly informed of a positive result in the testing of a disease.
For instance, the mass screening for breast-cancer in
women has recently raised severe criticism due to the fact
that it bears a high risk of false-positives. Being wrongly
diagnosed with breast cancer is usually extremely dis-
turbing for women and their families.13
The choice for a certain threshold in an algorithm is a
decision that is a judgment about which there is, or at least
could be, a controversy between advocates of the major
theories of normative ethics. This supports our claim that
algorithms manifest or reflect certain ethical judgments.
This point can be illustrated as a choice between deonto-
logical and consequentialist or utilitarian theories of nor-
mative ethics.
Deontologically minded users of the software are most
likely to focus on the physical and mental integrity of the
individual patient. Therefore, in a Kantian vein, medical
doctors will most probably opt for the implementation of
some more liberal algorithm when it comes to comput-
erised image analysis of severe diseases, aiming at more
false positives and less false negatives. In such a Kantian
vein, it is pre-eminent to protect the individual patient, i.e.
to avoid doing harm to him or her. Such harm would be
most likely to be done if a severe disease remains
undetected and therefore untreated. For this reason, the
deontologist is willing to put up with problematic con-
sequences of more false positives that are brought about
by her choice.
In contrast, a scientist who tries to gather statistical data
about a population of patients may wish to use the same
software, but she will typically prefer more strictly or
conservatively designed algorithms. This will bring about
results that are more in line with consequentialist or utili-
tarian decision-making: What is important in this per-
spective is that the body of scientific data as a whole
remains valid and intact, because this will typically bring
about better consequences in the long run, although some
individual patients may have to suffer along the road. This
is in accordance with the consequentialist or utilitarian
view that overall well-being in society should be our focus
of attention, rather than the rights or needs of single indi-
viduals. Therefore, on this view, aiming at scientific
insights that benefit the greatest number of people is the
highest priority. This means that within the consequen-
tialist approach, scientific results should be free from false
positives as far as possible. It is therefore acceptable that a
relatively large amount of false negatives will arise.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to take a stand on the
controversy over deontological and consequentialist nor-
mative theories. However, it is important to note that the
choice of a threshold value for a certain algorithm goes
hand in hand with some normative background assump-
tions specified by the software designer. Problems arise if it
is unforeseeable whether the background assumptions of
the designer will be in accordance with those of future
users (i.e. a doctor or a scientist). If the ethical assumptions
made by the software designer remain implicit and differ
from those preferred by the user, we face a rather severe
problem: Without knowing it, the user who bases her
13 See e.g. Gigerenzer et al. (2009) about these problems of screening
and their statistical implications.
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decisions on the output of the software will base those
normative choices on ethical assumptions that are in con-
flict with the implicit ethical assumptions made by the
software designer.
Should ethical values be user-defined?
Our general view is that software designers should, as far
as possible, leave ethical decisions to users (say, with an
external switch to choose between ‘preference for false
positives’ or ‘preference for false negatives’). Moreover,
when this is not possible the ethical assumptions in the
algorithm should at least be transparent and easy to identify
by users. In the case of medical image algorithms the users
amount to medical doctors and scientists. For the reasons
outlined in ‘‘The precautionary principle and ethical theo-
ries’’, physicians who use a software will typically work on
the assumption that it is better to get a false positive than a
false negative. But when scientists use exactly the same
software they are likely to have the opposite ethical view.
Such users will typically avoid false positives in the first
instance. These divergent ethical judgments could, of
course, easily be implemented into the software by
including some code that allows the user to specify her
preference between false positive and negatives.
We are aware that such a leave-it-to-the-user approach
may sometimes be impossible to implement, as indicated
above. There are cases in which it may just not be feasible
to directly ask users to express the required kind of ethical
judgments in numerical or quasi-numerical terms. Having
to take a stand on fundamental ethical issues before using a
software may be too difficult, and it may also be too
impractical to ask users to make the relevant ethical
choices. In such cases the underlying ethical assumptions
should at least be made transparent. However, in what
follows we shall set such cases aside and focus on cases in
which it may actually be feasible to eliminate ethical
judgments as far as possible from the algorithms underly-
ing the software.
At the heart of the matter is the fact that it is not just a
practical decision that must be made when designing an
algorithm, but a genuinely ethical one. To opt for either a
consequentialist or utilitarian or a deontological attitude
towards e.g. the choice between false positives and false
negatives amounts to a value judgment that brings about
ethically relevant implications for the patient’s health, for
those who are in touch with her, and for the progress of
science as a whole. As explained above, we therefore
advocate that the software designer should design the
algorithm such that it remains flexible and applicable to the
requirements of different ethical settings. To be more
precise, we propose that algorithms as far as possible
remain open to the user’s ethical preferences. The design of
the algorithm must allow the user to choose the circum-
stances in which she situates herself. We therefore think
that it is not enough that the designer makes his or her
assumptions transparent by letting the user know what the
ethical assumptions in the design stance were. Rather, it is
necessary that the designer leaves it to the user to specify
what ethical parameters to choose.
Having said this, we are of course aware that we now go
beyond what is usually required in the literature on the
ethics of image analysis. One of the few comments on the
ethics of image analysis stems from Gert-Jan Lokhorst who
was interviewed by van Strien (2008). He suggests that
software has to be trained on image materials that resemble
the ones it will have to analyse in the clinic, because the
software will recognise and identify only those matters on
which it was explicitly trained before. Moreover, Lokhorst
suggests that doctors have to undergo proper training
before they use the software. This will ensure that users
become aware of which sorts of image analysis samples the
system is familiar with, and this in turn ensures that users
will be able to properly assess the competences of the
software. Lokhorst’s final suggestion is that users and other
relevant parties should be provided with some basic
knowledge about the situations in which the algorithms
were developed by the designer, because (i) this will enable
them to decide in which clinical situations the program
should be applied and in which not, and (ii) it must also be
made clear in advance who is responsible for which step in
the process of image analysis.
Lokhorst thus implicitly agrees with us that it is essen-
tial to make the software designer’s ethical choices trans-
parent to the user. However, our way of formulating this
ethical requirement is more far-reaching than Lokhorst’s.
As explained above, we maintain that the software designer
must leave the responsibility for defining the default state
of the software to the user herself. This is required for
avoiding possible discrepancies between the ethical back-
ground assumptions of the software designer and users.
The example of the stenosis in ‘‘A real example’’ shows
that there is no a priori ‘‘correct’’ threshold value. How-
ever, the very first choice made by the software designer
will influence all further steps of diagnosis. In borderline-
cases, those choices may even affect the treatment sug-
gested to the patient by the doctor. This is disturbing,
especially in face of the fact that the software designer may
lack the proper medical background of a fully trained
physician.
According to our argument for implementing user-
defined ethical values, the doctor treating the individual
patient should be enabled to make the relevant choice
herself, as far as possible. If the patient is facing a severe
condition, the threshold value should perhaps be set more
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liberally, to make sure that at any sign of deterioration,
treatment is initiated. However, if the health condition of
the patient is estimated as overall good, the threshold value
should be set more conservatively to avoid ‘‘false alarms’’
that could lead to surgical interventions causing unneces-
sary harm to the patient.
Conclusion
We conclude that a strong case can be made for the claim
that some algorithms are essentially value-laden. Some
algorithms, such as those used for classifying cells as dis-
eased or non-diseased, forces the designer of the algorithm
to take a stand on controversial ethical issues, e.g. whether
it is more desirable to prefer false positive errors over false
negative ones. This is a controversial ethical issue, on
which there is a lot of disagreement among ethicists. We
propose that designers of algorithms should, as far as
possible, leave ethical issues to users, and when this is not
possible, the ethical assumptions in the algorithm should at
least be transparent and easy to identify by users.
Acknowledgment The authors wish to thank Robin van der Sligte
for extremely helpful discussions, and Sven Diekmann and Rosemary
Lowry for helpful comments on earlier drafts.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License which per-
mits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
References
Allen, C., Wallach, W., & Smit, I. (2006). Why machine ethics? IEEE
Intelligent Systems, 21, 12–17.
Arkin, R. C. (2009). Accountable autonomous agents: The next level.
Position paper for the DARPA Complete Intelligence Workshop,
Feb. 2009.
Gigerenzer, G., Mata, J., & Frank, R. (2009). Public knowledge of
benefits of breast and prostate cancer screening in Europe.
Journal of the National Cancer Institute. doi:10.1093/jnci/djp
1237.
Peterson, M. (2007). Should the precautionary principle guide our
actions or our beliefs? Journal of Medical Ethics, 33(1), 5–10.
Resnik, D. B. (2004). The precautionary principle and medical
decision making. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 29(3),
281–299.
Sipser, M. (1997). Introduction to the theory of computation, PWS
Publishing Company.
Turilli, M. (2007). Ethical protocols design. Ethics and Information
Technology, 9, 49–62.
van Strien, W. (2008). Opvangen zwakheden maakt beeldtechnieken
waardevoller (interview met G.J.C. Lokhorst). Ethiek, Ond-
erzoek en Bestuur, pp. 20–25. March 2008.
260 F. Kraemer et al.
123
